Differential Attacks on Reduced SIMON Versions with Dynamic Key-guessing Techniques

Ning Wang; Xiaoyun Wang; Keting Jia; Jingyuan Zhao

Paper 2014/448

Differential Attacks on Reduced SIMON Versions with Dynamic Key-guessing Techniques

Ning Wang, Xiaoyun Wang, Keting Jia, and Jingyuan Zhao

Abstract

SIMON is a family of lightweight block ciphers which are designed by the U.S National Security Agency in 2013. It has totally 10 versions corresponding to different block size $2n$ and key length $l_k$, named as SIMON$2n/l_k$. In this paper, we present a new differential attack by considering the sufficient bit conditions of the previous differential paths. Based on the bit conditions, we successfully propose a new type of dynamic key-guessing technique which greatly reduces the key space guessed. Our attacks work on the reduced SIMON of all 10 suggested versions, which improve the best previous results by 2 to 4 rounds. For verification, we implemented a practical attack on 19-round SIMON32 in a PC, and the experimental data confirm the correctness of the attack, which also fit the theoretical complexity and success rate very well. It is remarked that, our cryptanalysis only provides a more accurate security evaluation, and it does not mean the security problem of the whole SIMON family

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Publication info: Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords: SIMON lightweight block cipher bit condition differential attack dynamic key-guessing
Contact author(s): wangning2012 @ mail sdu edu cn
History: 2015-05-27: last of 3 revisions; 2014-06-14: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2014/448
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2014/448,
      author = {Ning Wang and Xiaoyun Wang and Keting Jia and Jingyuan Zhao},
      title = {Differential Attacks on Reduced {SIMON} Versions with Dynamic Key-guessing Techniques},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2014/448},
      year = {2014},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/448}
}