4-point Attacks  with Standard Deviation Analysis  on A-Feistel Schemes

Valerie Nachef; Jacques Patarin; Emmanuel Volte

Paper 2014/446

4-point Attacks with Standard Deviation Analysis on A-Feistel Schemes

Valerie Nachef, Jacques Patarin, and Emmanuel Volte

Abstract

A usual way to construct block ciphers is to apply several rounds of a given structure. Many kinds of attacks are mounted against block ciphers. Among them, differential and linear attacks are widely used. In~\cite{V98,V03}, it is shown that ciphers that achieve perfect pairwise decorrelation are secure against linear and differential attacks. It is possible to obtain such schemes by introducing at least one random affine permutation as a round function in the design of the scheme. In this paper, we study attacks on schemes based on classical Feistel schemes where we introduce one or two affine permutations. Since these schemes resist against linear and differential attacks, we will study stronger attacks based on specific equations on 4-tuples of cleartext/ciphertext messages. We give the number of messages needed to distinguish a permutation produced by such schemes from a random permutation, depending on the number of rounds used in the schemes, the number and the position of the random affine permutations introduced in the schemes.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Secret-key cryptography
Publication info: Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords: affine permutations classical Feistel permutations pseudo-random permutations generic attacks Luby-Rackoff theory block ciphers
Contact author(s): valerie nachef @ u-cergy fr
History: 2014-06-13: received
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2014/446
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2014/446,
      author = {Valerie Nachef and Jacques Patarin and Emmanuel Volte},
      title = {4-point Attacks  with Standard Deviation Analysis  on A-Feistel Schemes},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2014/446},
      year = {2014},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/446}
}