Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2014/446

4-point Attacks with Standard Deviation Analysis on A-Feistel Schemes

Valerie Nachef and Jacques Patarin and Emmanuel Volte

Abstract: A usual way to construct block ciphers is to apply several rounds of a given structure. Many kinds of attacks are mounted against block ciphers. Among them, differential and linear attacks are widely used. In~\cite{V98,V03}, it is shown that ciphers that achieve perfect pairwise decorrelation are secure against linear and differential attacks. It is possible to obtain such schemes by introducing at least one random affine permutation as a round function in the design of the scheme. In this paper, we study attacks on schemes based on classical Feistel schemes where we introduce one or two affine permutations. Since these schemes resist against linear and differential attacks, we will study stronger attacks based on specific equations on 4-tuples of cleartext/ciphertext messages. We give the number of messages needed to distinguish a permutation produced by such schemes from a random permutation, depending on the number of rounds used in the schemes, the number and the position of the random affine permutations introduced in the schemes.

Category / Keywords: secret-key cryptography / affine permutations, classical Feistel permutations, pseudo-random permutations, generic attacks, Luby-Rackoff theory, block ciphers

Date: received 10 Jun 2014

Contact author: valerie nachef at u-cergy fr

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20140613:152552 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2014/446

Discussion forum: Show discussion | Start new discussion