Paper 2014/414

A Security Proof of KCDSA using an extended Random Oracle Model

Vikram Singh

Abstract

We describe a tight security reduction to the discrete logarithm problem for KCDSA under an extended Random Oracle Model. This is achieved by generalising the signature scheme and producing a security proof for the generalised scheme. We require the application of Randomized Hashing. We also introduce a Challenger to the Random Oracle Model, who is external to the Simulator and Adversary. The Challenger provides oracle returns for one hash function, and challenges which have a low probability of being met. On presentation of a forged signature the Simulator either identifies an edge case which allows solving of a challenge, or solves the discrete logarithm problem. Hence the tight reduction.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
CryptographyProvable SecurityKCDSATight ReductionDiscrete Logarithm ProblemRandom Oracle Model
Contact author(s)
vs77814 @ gmail com
History
2014-06-04: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2014/414
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2014/414,
      author = {Vikram Singh},
      title = {A Security Proof of KCDSA using an extended Random Oracle Model},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2014/414},
      year = {2014},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/414}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/414}
}
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