The compiled program tolerates arbitrary independent tampering of the disks. That is, the adversary can tamper with the intermediate values produced by the CPU, and the program code of the compiled primitive on the public disk. In addition, it tolerates bounded independent leakage from the disks and continuous leakage from the communication channels between the disks and the CPU.
Although it is required that the circuit of the CPU is tamper and leakage proof, its design is independent of the actual primitive being computed and its internal storage is non-persistent, i.e., all secret registers are reset between invocations. Hence, our result can be interpreted as reducing the problem of shielding arbitrary complex computations to protecting a single, simple and ``universal'' component. As a main ingredient of our construction we use continuous non-malleable codes that satisfy certain additional properties.Category / Keywords: tamper resistance, non-malleable codes Date: received 14 May 2014 Contact author: danone83 at gmail com Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation Version: 20140515:063140 (All versions of this report) Short URL: ia.cr/2014/338 Discussion forum: Show discussion | Start new discussion