Paper 2014/325
A practical forgery and state recovery attack on the authenticated cipher PANDA-s
Xiutao FENG, Fan ZHANG, and Hui WANG
Abstract
PANDA is a family of authenticated ciphers submitted to CARSAR, which consists of two ciphers: PANDA-s and PANDA-b. In this work we present a state recovery attack against PANDA-s with time complexity about $2^{41}$ under the known-plaintext-attack model, which needs 137 pairs of known plaintext/ciphertext and about 2GB memories. Our attack is practical in a small workstation. Based on the above attack, we further deduce a forgery attack against PANDA-s, which can forge a legal ciphertext $(C,T)$ of an arbitrary plaintext $P$. The results show that PANDA-s is insecure.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Keywords
- CAESARPANDAstate recovery attackforgery attack
- Contact author(s)
- fengxt @ amss ac cn
- History
- 2014-05-10: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2014/325
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2014/325,
author = {Xiutao FENG and Fan ZHANG and Hui WANG},
title = {A practical forgery and state recovery attack on the authenticated cipher {PANDA}-s},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2014/325},
year = {2014},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/325}
}
