Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2014/283

Structural Lattice Reduction: Generalized Worst-Case to Average-Case Reductions and Homomorphic Cryptosystems

Nicolas Gama and Malika Izabachene and Phong Q. Nguyen and Xiang Xie

Abstract: In lattice cryptography, worst-case to average-case reductions rely on two problems: Ajtai's SIS and Regev's LWE, which both refer to a very small class of random lattices related to the group $G=\mZ_q^n$. We generalize worst-case to average-case reductions to all integer lattices of sufficiently large determinant, by allowing $G$ to be any (sufficiently large) finite abelian group. In particular, we obtain a partition of the set of full-rank integer lattices of large volume such that finding short vectors in a lattice chosen uniformly at random from any of the partition cells is as hard as finding short vectors in any integer lattice. Our main tool is a novel generalization of lattice reduction, which we call structural lattice reduction: given a finite abelian group $G$ and a lattice $L$, it finds a short basis of some lattice $\bar{L}$ such that $L \subseteq \bar{L}$ and $\bar{L}/L \simeq G$. Our group generalizations of SIS and LWE allow us to abstract lattice cryptography, yet preserve worst-case assumptions: as an example, we provide a somewhat conceptually simpler generalization of the Alperin-Sheriff-Peikert variant of the Gentry-Sahai-Waters homomorphic scheme. We introduce homomorphic mux gates, which allows us to homomorphically evaluate any boolean function with a noise overhead proportional to the square root of its number of variables, and bootstrap the full scheme using only a linear noise overhead.

Category / Keywords: Lattices, Worst-case to Average-case Reductions, Homomorphic Encryption, LWE, SIS, Hidden Number Problem

Date: received 23 Apr 2014, last revised 5 May 2015

Contact author: Phong Nguyen at inria fr

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Version: 20150505:135546 (All versions of this report)

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