Paper 2014/282
On The Orthogonal Vector Problem and The Feasibility of Unconditionally Secure Leakage Resilient Computation
Ivan Damgård, Frédéric Dupuis, and Jesper Buus Nielsen
Abstract
We consider unconditionally secure leakage resilient two-party
computation, where security means that the leakage obtained by an
adversary can be simulated using a similar amount of leakage from the
private inputs or outputs. A related problem is known as circuit
compilation, where there is only one device doing a computation on
public input and output. Here the goal is to ensure that the adversary
learns only the input/output behaviour of the computation, even given
leakage from the internal state of the device. We study these
problems in an enhanced version of the ``only computation leaks''
model, where the adversary is additionally allowed a bounded amount of
{\em global} leakage from the state of the entity under attack. In
this model, we show the first unconditionally secure leakage resilient
two-party computation protocol. The protocol assumes access to
correlated randomness in the form of a functionality
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Keywords
- QuantumLeakage-Resilience
- Contact author(s)
- jbn @ cs au dk
- History
- 2014-04-24: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2014/282
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2014/282, author = {Ivan Damgård and Frédéric Dupuis and Jesper Buus Nielsen}, title = {On The Orthogonal Vector Problem and The Feasibility of Unconditionally Secure Leakage Resilient Computation}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2014/282}, year = {2014}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/282} }