Paper 2014/279
Improved Impossible Differential Attacks against Round-Reduced LBlock
Christina Boura, Marine Minier, María Naya-Plasencia, and Valentin Suder
Abstract
Impossible differential attacks are among the most powerful forms of cryptanalysis against block ciphers. We present in this paper an in-depth complexity analysis of these attacks. We show an unified way to mount such attacks and provide generic formulas for estimating their time, data and memory complexities. LBlock is a well studied lightweight block cipher with respect to impossible differential attacks. While previous single-key cryptanalysis reached up to 22 rounds, by applying our method we are able to break 23 rounds with time complexity $2^{75.36}$ and data complexity $2^{59}$. Other time/data trade-offs are equally possible. This is to our knowledge the best (non-exhaustive search like) cryptanalysis of this function in the single-key model.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Keywords
- block ciphersimpossible differential attacksLBlock.
- Contact author(s)
- christina boura @ prism uvsq fr
- History
- 2014-09-09: last of 4 revisions
- 2014-04-24: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2014/279
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2014/279,
author = {Christina Boura and Marine Minier and María Naya-Plasencia and Valentin Suder},
title = {Improved Impossible Differential Attacks against Round-Reduced {LBlock}},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2014/279},
year = {2014},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/279}
}
