Paper 2014/270
Faster Maliciously Secure Two-Party Computation Using the GPU
Tore Kasper Frederiksen, Thomas Pelle Jakobsen, and Jesper Buus Nielsen
Abstract
We present a new protocol for maliciously secure two-party computation based on cut-and-choose of garbled circuits using the recent idea of “forge-and-loose”, which eliminates around a factor 3 of garbled circuits that needs to be constructed and evaluated. Our protocol introduces a new way to realize the “forge-and-loose” approach, which avoids an auxiliary secure two-party computation protocol, does not rely on any number theoretic assumptions and parallelizes well in a same instruction, multiple data (SIMD) framework. With this approach we prove our protocol universally composable secure against a malicious adversary assuming access to oblivious transfer, commitment and coin-tossing functionalities in the random oracle model. Finally, we construct, and benchmark, a SIMD implementation of this protocol using a GPU as a massive SIMD device. The findings compare favorably with all previous implementations of maliciously secure, two-party computation.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Minor revision. SCN 2014
- DOI
- 10.1007/978-3-319-10879-7_21
- Keywords
- cryptographic protocolsimplementationsecure two-party computationgarbled circuits
- Contact author(s)
- jot2re @ cs au dk
- History
- 2015-05-11: last of 3 revisions
- 2014-04-21: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2014/270
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2014/270, author = {Tore Kasper Frederiksen and Thomas Pelle Jakobsen and Jesper Buus Nielsen}, title = {Faster Maliciously Secure Two-Party Computation Using the {GPU}}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2014/270}, year = {2014}, doi = {10.1007/978-3-319-10879-7_21}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/270} }