Paper 2014/267

Differential Fault Analysis on the families of SIMON and SPECK ciphers

Harshal Tupsamudre, Shikha Bisht, and Debdeep Mukhopadhyay

Abstract

In 2013, the US National Security Agency proposed two new families of lightweight block ciphers: SIMON and SPECK. Currently, linear and differential cryptanalytic results for SIMON are available in the literature but no fault attacks have been reported so far on these two cipher families. In this paper, we show that these families of ciphers are vulnerable to differential fault attacks. Specifically, we demonstrate two fault attacks on SIMON and one fault attack on SPECK. The first attack on SIMON assumes a bit-flip fault model and recovers the n-bit last round key of SIMON using n/2 bit faults. The second attack on SIMON uses a more practical, random byte fault model and requires n/8 faults on average to retrieve the last round key. The attack presented on SPECK also assumes a bit-flip fault model and recovers the n-bit last round key of SPECK using n/3 bit faults on average.

Note: Added Simulation Results

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
Differential Fault AnalysisFault AttacksLightweight Block CiphersSIMONSPECK
Contact author(s)
harshal coep @ gmail com
s bisht09 @ gmail com
debdeep mukhopadhyay @ gmail com
History
2014-05-30: last of 14 revisions
2014-04-21: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2014/267
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2014/267,
      author = {Harshal Tupsamudre and Shikha Bisht and Debdeep Mukhopadhyay},
      title = {Differential Fault Analysis on the families of SIMON and SPECK ciphers},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2014/267},
      year = {2014},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/267}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/267}
}
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