A Forgery Attack against PANDA-s

Yu Sasaki; Lei Wang

Paper 2014/217

A Forgery Attack against PANDA-s

Yu Sasaki and Lei Wang

Abstract

\panda~is an authenticated encryption scheme designed by Ye {\it et al.}, and submitted to the CAESAR competition. The designers claim that \pandas, which is one of the designs of the \panda-family, provides 128-bit security in the nonce misuse model. In this note, we describe our forgery attack against \pandas. Our attack works in the nonce misuse model. It exploits the fact that the message processing function and the finalization function are identical, and thus a variant of the length-extension attack can be applied. We can find a tag for a pre-specified formatted message with 2 encryption oracle calls, $2^{64}$ computational cost, and negligible memory.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Secret-key cryptography
Publication info: Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords: PANDA Forgery Attack Nonce Misuse
Contact author(s): sasaki yu @ lab ntt co jp
History: 2014-03-24: received
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2014/217
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2014/217,
      author = {Yu Sasaki and Lei Wang},
      title = {A Forgery Attack against {PANDA}-s},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2014/217},
      year = {2014},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/217}
}