From Input Private to Universally Composable Secure Multiparty Computation Primitives

Dan Bogdanov; Peeter Laud; Sven Laur; Pille Pullonen

Paper 2014/201

From Input Private to Universally Composable Secure Multiparty Computation Primitives

Dan Bogdanov, Peeter Laud, Sven Laur, and Pille Pullonen

Abstract

Secure multiparty computation systems are commonly built form a small set of primitive components. Composability of security notions has a central role in the analysis of such systems, since it allows us to deduce security properties of complex protocols from the properties of its components. We show that the standard notions of universally composable security are overly restrictive in this context and can lead to protocols with sub-optimal performance. As a remedy, we introduce a weaker notion of privacy that is satisfied by simpler protocols and is preserved by composition. After that we fix a passive security model and show how to convert a private protocol into a universally composable protocol. As a result, we obtain modular security proofs without performance penalties.

Note: Updated the old version with more intuition about the defined concepts.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Cryptographic protocols
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Proceedings of the 2014 IEEE 27th Computer Security Foundations Symposium
Keywords: secure multiparty computation universal composability
Contact author(s): pille pullonen @ cyber ee
History: 2014-05-29: revised; 2014-03-17: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2014/201
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2014/201,
      author = {Dan Bogdanov and Peeter Laud and Sven Laur and Pille Pullonen},
      title = {From Input Private to Universally Composable Secure Multiparty Computation Primitives},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2014/201},
      year = {2014},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/201}
}