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Paper 2014/191

Side-Channel Analysis on Blinded Regular Scalar Multiplications

Benoit Feix and Mylène Roussellet and Alexandre Venelli

Abstract

We present a new side-channel attack path threatening state-of-the-art protected implementations of elliptic curves embedded scalar multiplications. Regular algorithms such as the double-and-add-always and the Montgomery ladder are commonly used to protect the scalar multiplication from simple side-channel analysis. Combining such algorithms with scalar and/or point blinding countermeasures lead to scalar multiplications protected from all known attacks. Scalar randomization, which consists in adding a random multiple of the group order to the scalar value, is a popular countermeasure due to its efficiency. Amongst the several curves defined for usage in elliptic curves products, the most used are those standardized by the NIST. The modulus, hence the orders, of these curves are sparse, primarily for efficiency reasons. In this paper, we take advantage of this specificity to present new attack paths and recover the secret scalar of state-of-the-art protected elliptic curve implementations.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Implementation
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
Elliptic curvesScalar multiplicationSide-channel analysisCorrelation analysis
Contact author(s)
alexandre venelli @ gmail com
History
2014-09-22: last of 3 revisions
2014-03-12: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2014/191
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY
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