In this work we explore the possibility of using cut-and-choose for practical secure three-party computation. The three-party case has been studied in prior work in the semi-honest setting, and is motivated by the observation that real-world deployments of multi-party computation are likely to involve few parties. We propose a constant-round protocol for three-party computation tolerating any number of malicious parties, whose computational cost is essentially only a small constant worse than that of state-of-the-art two-party protocols.
Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / secure computation Original Publication (with major differences): IACR-CRYPTO-2014 Date: received 19 Feb 2014, last revised 27 Jun 2014 Contact author: amaloz at cs umd edu Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation Note: - Corrected computation/communication costs. - Cleaned up some writing. - Updated motivation for 3PC. Version: 20140627:172144 (All versions of this report) Short URL: ia.cr/2014/128 Discussion forum: Show discussion | Start new discussion