Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2014/123

FORSAKES: A Forward-Secure Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol Based on Symmetric Key-Evolving Schemes

Mohammad Sadeq Dousti and Rasool Jalili

Abstract: This paper suggests a model and a definition for forward-secure authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols, which can be satisfied without depending on the Diffie-Hellman assumption. The basic idea is to use key-evolving schemes (KES), where the long-term keys of the system get updated regularly and irreversibly. Protocols conforming to our model can be highly efficient, since they do not require the resource-intensive modular exponentiations of the Diffie-Hellman protocol. We also introduce a protocol, called FORSAKES, and prove rigorously that it is a forward-secure AKE protocol in our model. FORSAKES is a very efficient protocol, and can be implemented by merely using hash functions.

Category / Keywords: secret-key cryptography / Authenticated Key Exchange Protocol, Forward Security, Key Evolving Schemes, Provable Security, Security Model

Date: received 16 Feb 2014, last revised 1 Mar 2014

Contact author: msdousti at gmail com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20140301:091159 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2014/123

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