One question that appears to have received very little attention, however, is that of MPC over an underlying communication network whose structure is, in itself, sensitive information. This question, in addition to being of pure theoretical interest, arises naturally in many contexts: designing privacy-preserving social-networks, private peer-to-peer computations, vehicle-to-vehicle networks and the ``internet of things'' are some of the examples.
In this paper, we initiate the study of ``topology-hiding computation'' in the computational setting. We give formal definitions in both simulation-based and indistinguishability-based flavors. We show that, even for fail-stop adversaries, there are some strong impossibility results. Despite this, we show that protocols for topology-hiding computation can be constructed in the semi-honest and fail-stop models, if we somewhat restrict the set of nodes the adversary may corrupt.Category / Keywords: foundations / foundations, anonymity, secure computation Original Publication (with minor differences): IACR-TCC-2015 Date: received 31 Dec 2014 Contact author: talm at idc ac il Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation Version: 20150101:144843 (All versions of this report) Short URL: ia.cr/2014/1022 Discussion forum: Show discussion | Start new discussion