Paper 2014/1010
On Continuous After-the-Fact Leakage-Resilient Key Exchange
Mohsen Toorani
Abstract
Side-channel attacks are severe type of attack against implementation of cryptographic primitives. Leakage-resilient cryptography is a new theoretical approach to formally address the problem of side-channel attacks. Recently, the Continuous After-the-Fact Leakage (CAFL) security model has been introduced for two-party authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols. In the CAFL model, an adversary can adaptively request arbitrary leakage of long-term secrets even after the test session is activated. It supports continuous leakage even when the adversary learns certain ephemeral secrets or session keys. The amount of leakage is limited per query, but there is no bound on the total leakage. A generic leakage-resilient key exchange protocol
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Keywords
- Leakage-resilient cryptographyCryptographic protocolsKey exchangeSecurity models
- Contact author(s)
- mohsen toorani @ gmail com
- History
- 2014-12-26: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2014/1010
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2014/1010, author = {Mohsen Toorani}, title = {On Continuous After-the-Fact Leakage-Resilient Key Exchange}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2014/1010}, year = {2014}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2014/1010} }