Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2014/075

Publicly Auditable Secure Multi-Party Computation

Carsten Baum and Ivan Damgård and Claudio Orlandi

Abstract: In the last few years the efficiency of secure multi-party computation (MPC) increased in several orders of magnitudes. However, this alone might not be enough if we want MPC protocols to be used in practice. A crucial property that is needed in many applications is that everyone can check that a given (secure) computation was performed correctly -- even in the extreme case where all the parties involved in the computation are corrupted, and even if the party who wants to verify the result was not involved. An obvious example of this is electronic voting, but also in many types of auctions one may want independent verification of the result. Traditionally, this is achieved by using non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs.

A recent trend in MPC protocols is to have a more expensive preprocessing phase followed by a very efficient online phase, e.g., the recent so-called SPDZ protocol by Damgård et al. Applications such as voting and some auctions are perfect applications for these protocols, as the parties usually know well in advance when the computation will take place, and using those protocols allows us to use only cheap information theoretic primitives in the actual computation. Unfortunately no protocol of the SPDZ type supports an audit phase.

In this paper we formalize the concept of publicly auditable secure computation and provide an enhanced version of the SPDZ protocol where, even if all the servers are corrupted, anyone with access to the transcript of the protocol can check that the output is indeed correct. Most importantly, we do so without compromising the performance of SPDZ i.e., the cost of our online phase is the same as that of SPDZ, up to a small constant factor of about two.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / Efficient Multiparty Computation, Electronic voting, Public Verifiability

Date: received 3 Feb 2014, last revised 10 Feb 2014

Contact author: cbaum at cs au dk

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Version: 20140210:123550 (All versions of this report)

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