Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2013/862

How to Delegate Computations: The Power of No-Signaling Proofs

Yael Tauman Kalai and Ran Raz and Ron Rothblum

Abstract: We construct a 1-round delegation scheme (i.e., argument-system) for every language computable in time t=t(n), where the running time of the prover is poly(t) and the running time of the verifier is n*polylog(t). In particular, for every language in P we obtain a delegation scheme with almost linear time verification. Our construction relies on the existence of a computational sub-exponentially secure private information retrieval (PIR) scheme.

The proof exploits a curious connection between the problem of computation delegation and the model of multi-prover interactive proofs that are sound against no-signaling (cheating) strategies, a model that was studied in the context of multi-prover interactive proofs with provers that share quantum entanglement, and is motivated by the physical principle that information cannot travel faster than light.

For any language computable in time t=t(n), we construct a multi-prover interactive proof (MIP) that is sound against no-signaling strategies, where the running time of the provers is poly(t), the number of provers is polylog(t), and the running time of the verifier is n*polylog(t).

In particular, this shows that the class of languages that have polynomial-time MIPs that are sound against no-signaling strategies, is exactly EXP. Previously, this class was only known to contain PSPACE.

To convert our MIP into a 1-round delegation scheme, we use the method suggested by Aiello et-al (ICALP, 2000), which makes use of a PIR scheme. This method lacked a proof of security. We prove that this method is secure assuming the underlying MIP is secure against no-signaling provers.

Category / Keywords: Delegation, Probabilistic Proof Systems, Interactive Arguments

Date: received 22 Dec 2013, last revised 22 Dec 2013

Contact author: ron rothblum at weizmann ac il

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20131229:113442 (All versions of this report)

Discussion forum: Show discussion | Start new discussion


[ Cryptology ePrint archive ]