Provable security has been an area of contention. Some, such as Koblitz and Menezes, give little credit to the potential extra security provided and argue that it is a distracting goal. However, others believe that an algorithm with a security proof is superior to one without it, and are prepared to accept the impact to performance that their use might involve. Goldreich has been notable for his defence of the security proof, and for his opposition to the view of Koblitz and Menezes.
This paper is designed to help the reader make their own decisions on security proofs. We achieve this by giving an introduction to the typical security model used, then give a description of the EDL signature scheme and its tight reduction to the CDH problem in the Random Oracle Model, then analyse the proof's assumptions, meaning, validity and overhead for real world security.Category / Keywords: public-key cryptography / Provable Security, EDL Signature Scheme, Tight Reduction, Computational Diffie Hellman problem, Random Oracle Model Date: received 5 Dec 2013 Contact author: vs77814 at gmail com Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation Version: 20131216:190443 (All versions of this report) Short URL: ia.cr/2013/831 Discussion forum: Show discussion | Start new discussion