Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2013/820
On the Security of Recently Proposed RFID Protocols
Mete Akgün, M. Ufuk Çaǧlayan
Abstract: RFID authentication protocols should have a secret updating phase in order to protect the privacy of RFID tags against tag tracing attacks. In the literature, there are many lightweight RFID authentication protocols that try to provide key updating with lightweight cryptographic primitives. In this paper, we analyse the security of two recently proposed lightweight RFID authentication protocol against de-synchronization attacks. We show that secret values shared between the back-end server and any given tag can be easily desynchronised. This weakness stems from the insufficient design of these protocols.
Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / RFID, authentication protocols, de-synchronization attacks.
Date: received 4 Dec 2013, withdrawn 19 Dec 2014
Contact author: mete akgun at tubitak gov tr
Available format(s): (-- withdrawn --)
Version: 20141219:145524 (All versions of this report)
Short URL: ia.cr/2013/820
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