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Paper 2013/733

A Key Compromise Impersonation attack against Wang's Provably Secure Identity-based Key Agreement Protocol

Maurizio Adriano Strangio

Abstract

In a 2005 IACR report, Wang published an efficient identity-based key agreement protocol (IDAK) suitable for resource constraint devices. The author shows that the IDAK key agreement protocol is secure in the Bellare-Rogaway model with random oracles and also provides an ad-hoc security proof claiming that the IDAK protocol is not vulnerable to Key Compromise Impersonation attacks. In this report, we claim that the IDAK protocol is vulnerable to key-compromise impersonation attacks. Indeed, Wang's results are valid only for a passive adversary that can corrupt parties or reveal certain session-specific data but is not allowed to manipulate protocol transcripts; a model considering this type of adversary is unable to afford KCI resilience.

Metadata
Available format(s)
-- withdrawn --
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Contact author(s)
strangio @ mat uniroma3 it
History
2013-11-15: withdrawn
2013-11-14: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2013/733
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY
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