Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2013/733

A Key Compromise Impersonation attack against Wang's Provably Secure Identity-based Key Agreement Protocol

Maurizio Adriano Strangio

Abstract: In a 2005 IACR report, Wang published an efficient identity-based key agreement protocol (IDAK) suitable for resource constraint devices.

The author shows that the IDAK key agreement protocol is secure in the Bellare-Rogaway model with random oracles and also provides an ad-hoc security proof claiming that the IDAK protocol is not vulnerable to Key Compromise Impersonation attacks.

In this report, we claim that the IDAK protocol is vulnerable to key-compromise impersonation attacks. Indeed, Wang's results are valid only for a passive adversary that can corrupt parties or reveal certain session-specific data but is not allowed to manipulate protocol transcripts; a model considering this type of adversary is unable to afford KCI resilience.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols /

Date: received 8 Nov 2013, last revised 8 Nov 2013, withdrawn 15 Nov 2013

Contact author: strangio at mat uniroma3 it

Available format(s): (-- withdrawn --)

Version: 20131115:112304 (All versions of this report)

Short URL:

Discussion forum: Show discussion | Start new discussion

[ Cryptology ePrint archive ]