Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2013/717
NICV: Normalized Inter-Class Variance for Detection of Side-Channel Leakage
Shivam Bhasin and Jean-Luc Danger and Sylvain Guilley and Zakaria Najm
Abstract: Side-Channel Attacks (SCA) are considered a serious threat against embedded cryptography. Therefore security critical chips must be tested for SCA resistance before deployment or certification. SCA are powerful but can need a lot of computation power, especially in the presence of countermeasures. The computation complexity of these attacks can be reduced by selecting a small subset of points where leakage prevails. In this paper, we propose a method to detect relevant leakage points in side-channel traces. The method is based on Normalized Inter-Class Variance (NICV). A key advantage of NICV over state-of-the-art is that NICV does neither need a clone device nor the knowledge of secret parameters of the crypto-system. NICV has a low computation requirement and it detects leakage using public information like input plaintexts or output ciphertexts only. It can also be used to test the efficiency of leakage models, the quality of traces and robustness of countermeasures. A theoretical rationale of NICV with practical application on real crypto-systems are provided to support our claims.
Category / Keywords: applications / Cryptography, Side-channel analysis, Leakage Detection
Original Publication (with minor differences): HASP 2014
Date: received 2 Nov 2013, last revised 1 May 2014
Contact author: shivam bhasin at telecom-paristech fr
Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation
Note: Give more reference w.r.t. the state-of-the-art, and also improved the section 3.2 related to the prediction of the minimal number of traces to recover the key.
Version: 20140501:214015 (All versions of this report)
Short URL: ia.cr/2013/717
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