Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2013/614

Is extracting data the same as possessing data?

Douglas R. Stinson and Jalaj Upadhyay

Abstract: Proof-of-retrievability schemes have been a topic of considerable recent interest. In these schemes, a client gives a file M to a server with the understanding that the server will securely store M. A suitable challenge-response protocol is invoked by the client in order for the client to gain confidence that M is indeed being correctly stored by the server. The definition of proof-of-retrievability schemes is based on the notion of an extractor that can recover the file once the challenge-response protocol is executed a sufficient number of times.

In this paper, we propose a new type of scheme that we term a proof-of-data-observability scheme. Our definition tries to capture the stronger requirement that the server must have an actual copy of M in its memory space while it executes the challenge-response protocol. We give some examples of schemes that satisfy this new security definition. As well, we analyze the efficiency and security of the protocols we present, and we prove some necessary conditions for the existence of these kinds of protocols.

Category / Keywords: applications / proof-of-retrievability

Date: received 24 Sep 2013

Contact author: dstinson at uwaterloo ca

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20130926:013335 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2013/614

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