Paper 2013/601

Two-round secure MPC from Indistinguishability Obfuscation

Sanjam Garg, Craig Gentry, Shai Halevi, and Mariana Raykova

Abstract

One fundamental complexity measure of an MPC protocol is its {\em round complexity}. Asharov et al. recently constructed the first three-round protocol for general MPC in the CRS model. Here, we show how to achieve this result with only two rounds. We obtain UC security with abort against static malicious adversaries, and fairness if there is an honest majority. Additionally the communication in our protocol is only proportional to the input and output size of the function being evaluated and independent of its circuit size. Our main tool is indistinguishability obfuscation, for which a candidate construction was recently proposed by Garg et al. The technical tools that we develop in this work also imply virtual black box obfuscation of a new primitive that we call a \emph{dynamic point function}. This primitive may be of independent interest.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint.
Keywords
Multilinear MapsIndistinguishability ObfuscationMultiparty Secure Computation
Contact author(s)
sanjamg @ cs ucla edu
craigbgentry @ gmail com
shaih @ alum mit edu
mariana @ cs columbia edu
History
2013-09-19: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2013/601
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2013/601,
      author = {Sanjam Garg and Craig Gentry and Shai Halevi and Mariana Raykova},
      title = {Two-round secure MPC from Indistinguishability Obfuscation},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2013/601},
      year = {2013},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/601}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/601}
}
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