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Paper 2013/592

Cryptanalysis of the Toorani-Falahati Hill Ciphers

Liam Keliher and Anthony Z. Delaney

Abstract

In 2009 and 2011, Toorani and Falahati introduced two variants of the classical Hill Cipher, together with protocols for the exchange of encrypted messages. The designers claim that the new systems overcome the weaknesses of the original Hill Cipher, and are resistant to any ciphertext-only, known-plaintext, chosen-plaintext, or chosen-ciphertext attack. However, we describe a chosen-plaintext attack that easily breaks both Toorani-Falahati Hill Ciphers, and we present computational results that confirm the effectiveness of our attack.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. IEEE Symposium on Computers and Communications (ISCC 2013)
Keywords
block cipherscryptanalysissecret-key cryptography
Contact author(s)
lkeliher @ mta ca
History
2013-09-14: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2013/592
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY
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