Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2013/561

Preimage attacks on the round-reduced Keccak with the aid of differential cryptanalysis

Pawel Morawiecki and Josef Pieprzyk and Marian Srebrny and Michal Straus

Abstract: In this paper we use differential cryptanalysis to attack the winner of the SHA-3 competition, namely Keccak hash function. Despite more than 6 years of intensive cryptanalysis there have been known only two preimage attacks which reach 3 (or slightly more) rounds. Our 3-round preimage attack improves the complexity of those two existing attacks and it is obtained with a different technique. We also show the partial preimage attack on the 4-round Keccak, exploiting two properties of the linear step of the Keccak-f permutation.

Category / Keywords: secret-key cryptography / preimage attack, Keccak, differential cryptanalysis, SHA-3

Date: received 4 Sep 2013

Contact author: pawel morawiecki at gmail com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20130904:142414 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2013/561

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