You are looking at a specific version 20130912:094033 of this paper. See the latest version.

Paper 2013/531

On the Limits of Provable Anonymity

Nethanel Gelernter and Amir Herzberg

Abstract

We study provably secure anonymity, focusing on ultimate anonymity - strongest-possible anonymity requirements and adversaries. We begin with rigorous definition of anonymity against wide range of computationally-bounded attackers, including eavesdroppers, malicious peers, malicious destina-tions, and their combinations. Following the work of Hevia and Micciancio [15], our definition is generic, and captures different notions of anonymity (e.g., unobservability and sender anonymity). We then study the feasibility of ultimate anonymity. We show there is a protocol satisfying this requirement, but with absurd (although polynomial) inefficiency and overhead. We show that such inefficiency and overhead is unavoidable for `ultimate anonymity'. We then present a slightly-relaxed requirement and present feasible protocols for it.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Minor revision. WPES 2013
Keywords
anonymity
Contact author(s)
nethanel gelernter @ gmail com
History
2013-09-12: last of 2 revisions
2013-08-30: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2013/531
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.