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Paper 2013/506

A Formal Proof of Countermeasures Against Fault Injection Attacks on CRT-RSA

Pablo Rauzy and Sylvain Guilley

Abstract

In this article, we describe a methodology that aims at either breaking or proving the security of CRT-RSA implementations against fault injection attacks. In the specific case-study of the BellCoRe attack, our work bridges a gap between formal proofs and implementation-level attacks. We apply our results to three implementations of CRT-RSA, namely the unprotected one, that of Shamir, and that of Aumüller \etal Our findings are that many attacks are possible on both the unprotected and the Shamir implementations, while the implementation of Aumüller \etal is resistant to all single-fault attacks. It is also resistant to double-fault attacks if we consider the less powerful threat-model of its authors.

Note: Paper originally published at PROOFS 2013. This is a new version of the paper with fixes and updates corresponding to the extended version which will appear in a PROOFS Special Issue of JCEN.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
RSACRTfault injectionBellCoRe attackformal proofOCaml
Contact author(s)
rauzy @ enst fr
History
2014-01-30: last of 4 revisions
2013-08-17: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2013/506
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY
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