We lay the theoretical groundwork for a study of cryptographic protocol design in this setting by providing a methodology for defining the problem within the traditional simulation paradigm. Our framework provides ways of reasoning about important cryptographic concepts (e.g., adaptive corruptions or attacks on communication resources) not handled by previous game-theoretic treatments of cryptography. We also prove composition theorems that—for the first time—provide a sound way to design rational protocols assuming “ideal communication resources” (such as broadcast or authenticated channels) and then instantiate these resources using standard cryptographic tools.
Finally, we investigate the problem of secure function evaluation in our framework, where the attacker has to pay for each party it corrupts. Our results demonstrate how knowledge of the attacker’s incentives can be used toCategory / Keywords: foundations / Cryptographic Protocols, Game Theory, Secure Computation, Composition Original Publication (with major differences): FOCS 2013 Date: received 13 Aug 2013, last revised 15 Aug 2013 Contact author: vzikas at cs ucla edu Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation Version: 20130815:164401 (All versions of this report) Short URL: ia.cr/2013/496 Discussion forum: Show discussion | Start new discussion