Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2013/460

Solving Terminal Revocation in EAC by Augmenting Terminal Authentication

Rafik Chaabouni

Abstract: In this paper we propose a solution to enable an accurate terminal revocation in the Extended Access Control (EAC). Chaabouni and Vaudenay in [CV09] pointed out the need for an accurate revocation procedure, but failed to provide a complete solution description. We aim at filling this gap. Our solution relies on augmenting terminal authentication with a t-out-of-l threshold signature provided by neighboring terminals. These terminals will be in charge of checking the revocation status of the requested terminal. As Terminals have a real clock embedded and more computational power than Machine Readable Travel Documents (MRTDs), they are better suited for checking revocation status.

Category / Keywords: public-key cryptography / EAC, MRTD, Authentication, Revocation

Original Publication (with major differences): proceedings of BIOSIG 2013

Date: received 24 Jul 2013, last revised 13 Aug 2013

Contact author: rafik at chaabouni ch

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Note: minor revisions and typos (this is the fullpaper version)

Version: 20130813:131253 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2013/460

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