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Paper 2013/448
Flush+Reload: a High Resolution, Low Noise, L3 Cache Side-Channel Attack
Yuval Yarom and Katrina Falkner
Abstract
Flush+Reload is a cache side-channel attack that monitors access to data in shared pages. In this paper we demonstrate how to use the attack to extract private encryption keys from GnuPG. The high resolution and low noise of the Flush+Reload attack enables a spy program to recover over 98% of the bits of the private key in a single decryption or signing round. Unlike previous attacks, the attack targets the last level L3 cache. Consequently, the spy program and the victim do not need to share the execution core of the CPU. The attack is not limited to a traditional OS and can be used in a virtualised environment, where it can attack programs executing in a different VM.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- Side Channel AttackCacheRSAExponentiation
- Contact author(s)
- yval @ cs adelaide edu au
- History
- 2014-07-05: revised
- 2013-07-22: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2013/448
- License
-
CC BY