Paper 2013/429
DupLESS: Server-Aided Encryption for Deduplicated Storage
Mihir Bellare, Sriram Keelveedhi, and Thomas Ristenpart
Abstract
Cloud storage service providers such as Dropbox, Mozy, and others perform deduplication to save space by only storing one copy of each file uploaded. Should clients conventionally encrypt their files, however, savings are lost. Message-locked encryption (the most prominent manifestation of which is convergent encryption) resolves this tension. However it is inherently subject to brute-force attacks that can recover files falling into a known set. We propose an architecture that provides secure deduplicated storage resisting brute-force attacks, and realize it in a system called DupLESS. In DupLESS, clients encrypt under message-based keys obtained from a key-server via an oblivious PRF protocol. It enables clients to store encrypted data with an existing service, have the service perform deduplication on their behalf, and yet achieves strong confidentiality guarantees. We show that encryption for deduplicated storage can achieve performance and space savings close to that of using the storage service with plaintext data.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Usenix Security Symposium 2013
- Keywords
- storagededuplicationmessage-locked encryptionconvergent encryption
- Contact author(s)
- sriramkr @ cs ucsd edu
- History
- 2013-07-03: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2013/429
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2013/429,
author = {Mihir Bellare and Sriram Keelveedhi and Thomas Ristenpart},
title = {{DupLESS}: Server-Aided Encryption for Deduplicated Storage},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2013/429},
year = {2013},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/429}
}
