Paper 2013/393

Strongly Secure One-round Group Authenticated Key Exchange in the Standard Model

Yong Li and Zheng Yang

Abstract

One-round group authenticated key exchange (GAKE) protocols typically provide implicit authentication and appealing bind-width efficiency. As a special case of GAKE -- the pairing-based one-round tripartite authenticated key exchange (3AKE), recently gains much attention of research community due to its strong security. Several pairing-based one-round 3AKE protocols have recently been proposed to achieve provable security in the g-eCK model. In contrast to earlier GAKE models, the g-eCK model particularly formulates the security properties regarding resilience to the leakage of various combinations of long-term key and ephemeral session state, and provision of weak perfect forward secrecy in a single model. However, the g-eCK security proofs of previous protocols are only given under the random oracle model. In this work, we give a new construction for pairing-based one-round 3AKE protocol which is provably secure in the g-eCK model without random oracles. Security of proposed protocol is reduced to the hardness of Cube Bilinear Decisional Diffie-Hellman (CBDDH) problem for symmetric pairing. We also extend the proposed 3AKE scheme to a GAKE scheme with more than three group members, based on multilinear maps. We prove g-eCK security of our GAKE scheme in the standard model under the natural multilinear generalization of the CBDDH assumption.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Minor revision. The 12th International Conference on Cryptology and Network Security
Contact author(s)
zheng yang @ rub de
History
2013-12-03: last of 3 revisions
2013-06-18: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2013/393
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2013/393,
      author = {Yong Li and Zheng Yang},
      title = {Strongly Secure One-round Group Authenticated Key Exchange in the Standard Model},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2013/393},
      year = {2013},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/393}
}
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