Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2013/378

A note on quantum related-key attacks

Martin Roetteler and Rainer Steinwandt

Abstract: In a basic related-key attack against a block cipher, the adversary has access to encryptions under keys that differ from the target key by bit-flips. In this short note we show that for a quantum adversary such attacks are quite powerful: if the secret key is (i) uniquely determined by a small number of plaintext-ciphertext pairs, (ii) the block cipher can be evaluated efficiently, and (iii) a superposition of related keys can be queried, then the key can be extracted efficiently.

Category / Keywords: secret-key cryptography / quantum computing, related-key attack

Publication Info: arXiv:1306.2301 [quant-ph]

Date: received 11 Jun 2013

Contact author: rsteinwa at fau edu

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20130612:145853 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2013/378

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