eprint.iacr.org will be offline for approximately an hour
for routine maintenance at 11pm UTC on Tuesday, April 16. We lost some data between
April 12 and April 14, and some authors have been notified that they need to resubmit their papers.
You are looking at a specific version 20130712:103655 of this paper.
See the latest version.
Paper 2013/368
Security in $O(2^n)$ for the Xor of Two Random Permutations\\ -- Proof with the standard $H$ technique--
Jacques Patarin
Abstract
Xoring two permutations is a very simple way to construct pseudorandom functions from pseudorandom permutations. In~\cite{P08a}, it is proved that we have security against CPA-2 attacks when $m \ll O(2^n)$, where $m$ is the number of queries and $n$ is the number of bits of the inputs and outputs of the bijections. In this paper, we will obtain similar (but slightly different) results by using the ``standard H technique'' instead of the ``$H_{\sigma}$ technique''. It will be interesting to compare the two techniques, their similarities and the differences between the proofs and the results.
Note: A section and an appendix have been added
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- Pseudorandom functionspseudorandom permutationssecurity beyond the birthday boundLuby-Rackoff backwards.
- Contact author(s)
- valerie nachef @ u-cergy fr
- History
- 2016-02-22: last of 2 revisions
- 2013-06-10: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2013/368
- License
-
CC BY
