Paper 2013/368
Security in $O(2^n)$ for the Xor of Two Random Permutations\\ -- Proof with the standard $H$ technique--
Jacques Patarin
Abstract
Xoring two permutations is a very simple way to construct pseudorandom functions from pseudorandom permutations. In~\cite{P08a}, it is proved that we have security against CPA-2 attacks when $m \ll O(2^n)$, where $m$ is the number of queries and $n$ is the number of bits of the inputs and outputs of the bijections. In this paper, we will obtain similar (but slightly different) results by using the ``standard H technique'' instead of the ``$H_{\sigma}$ technique''. It will be interesting to compare the two techniques, their similarities and the differences between the proofs and the results.
Note: A section and an appendix have been added
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown status
- Keywords
- Pseudorandom functionspseudorandom permutationssecurity beyond the birthday boundLuby-Rackoff backwards.
- Contact author(s)
- valerie nachef @ u-cergy fr
- History
- 2016-02-22: last of 2 revisions
- 2013-06-10: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2013/368
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2013/368,
author = {Jacques Patarin},
title = {Security in $O(2^n)$ for the Xor of Two Random Permutations\\ -- Proof with the standard $H$ technique--},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2013/368},
year = {2013},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/368}
}
