Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2013/323
Encryption Schemes with Post-Challenge Auxiliary Inputs
Tsz Hon Yuen and Ye Zhang and Siu-Ming Yiu
Abstract: In this paper, we tackle the open problem of proposing a leakage-resilience encryption model that can capture leakage from both the secret key owner and the encryptor, in the auxiliary input model. Existing models usually do not allow adversaries to query more leakage
information after seeing the challenge ciphertext of the security games. On one hand, side-channel attacks on the random factor (selected by the encryptor) are already shown to be feasible. Leakage from the encryptor should not be overlooked. On the other hand, the technical challenge for allowing queries from the adversary after he sees the ciphertext is to avoid a trivial attack to the system since he can then embed the decryption function as the leakage function (note that we consider the auxiliary input model in which the leakage is modeled as computationally hard-to-invert functions). We solve this problem by defining the post-challenge auxiliary input model in which the family of leakage functions must be defined before the adversary is given the public key. Thus the adversary cannot embed the decryption function as a leakage function after seeing the challenge ciphertext while is allowed to make challenge-dependent queries. This model is able to capture a wider class of real-world side-channel attacks.
To realize our model, we propose a generic transformation from the auxiliary input model to our new post-challenge auxiliary input model for both public key encryption (PKE) and identity-based encryption (IBE). Furthermore, we extend Canetti et al.'s technique, that converts CPA-secure IBE to CCA-secure PKE, into the leakage-resilient setting. More precisely, we construct a CCA-secure PKE in the post-challenge auxiliary input model, by using strong one-time signatures and strong extractor with hard-to-invert auxiliary inputs, together with a CPA-secure IBE in the auxiliary input model. Moreover, we extend our results to signatures, to obtain fully leakage-resilient signatures with auxiliary inputs using standard signatures and strong extractor with hard-to-invert auxiliary inputs. It is more efficient than the existing fully leakage-resilient signature schemes.
Category / Keywords: public-key cryptography / leakage-resilient, auxiliary inputs, randomness
Date: received 26 May 2013
Contact author: thyuen at cs hku hk
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Version: 20130602:133050 (All versions of this report)
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