Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2013/289

Secure Second Price Auctions with a Rational Auctioneer

Boaz Catane and Amir Herzberg

Abstract: We present novel security requirements for second price auctions and a simple, efficient and practical protocol that provably maintains these requirements. Novel requirements are needed because commonly used requirements, such as the indistinguishability-based secrecy requirement of encryption schemes presented by \cite{goldwasser1982pep}, do not fit properly in the second price auctions context. Additionally, the presented protocol uses a trustworthy supervisor that checks if the auctioneer deviated from the protocol and fines him accordingly. By making sure the expected utility of the auctioneer when deviating from the protocol is lower than his expected utility when abiding by the protocol we ascertain that a {\em rational} auctioneer will abide by the protocol. This allows the supervisor to optimize by performing (computationally-intensive) inspections of the auctioneer with only low probability.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / Auctions, Cryptographic Auction Schemes, Cryptographic Protocols, Vickrey Auctions

Date: received 16 May 2013, last revised 26 May 2013

Contact author: boaz catane at mail huji ac il

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20130526:125105 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2013/289

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