* We formally define ballot independence as a cryptographic game and prove that ballot secrecy implies ballot independence.
* We introduce a notion of controlled malleability and show that it is sufficient for ballot independence. We also show that non-malleable ballots are sufficient, but not necessary, for ballot independence.
* We prove that ballot independence is sufficient for ballot secrecy under practical assumptions.
Our results show that ballot independence is necessary in election schemes satisfying ballot secrecy. Furthermore, our sufficient conditions will enable simpler proofs of ballot secrecy.Category / Keywords: foundations / anonymity, applications, ballot independence, ballot secrecy, election schemes, foundations Publication Info: ESORICS'13: 18th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security Date: received 23 Apr 2013, last revised 18 Jun 2013 Contact author: research at bensmyth com Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation Version: 20130618:102144 (All versions of this report) Short URL: ia.cr/2013/235 Discussion forum: Show discussion | Start new discussion