Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2013/205
Practical and Employable Protocols for UC-Secure Circuit Evaluation over $Z_n$
Jan Camenisch and Robert R. Enderlein and Victor Shoup
Abstract: We present a set of new, efficient, universally composable
two-party protocols for evaluating
reactive arithmetic circuits modulo n,
where n is a safe RSA modulus of unknown factorization.
Our protocols are based on
a homomorphic encryption scheme with message space $Z_n$,
zero-knowledge proofs of existence,
and a novel "mixed" trapdoor commitment scheme.
Our protocols are proven
secure against adaptive corruptions
(assuming secure erasures) under standard assumptions
in the CRS model (without random oracles).
Our protocols appear to be the most efficient ones
that satisfy these security requirements.
In contrast to prior protocols, we provide facilities that allow for the use of our protocols
as building blocks of higher-level protocols.
An additional contribution of this paper is a universally
composable construction of the variant of the Dodis-Yampolskiy
oblivious pseudorandom function in a group of order n
as originally proposed by Jarecki and Liu.
Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / Two-party computation, Practical Protocols, UC-Security
Publication Info: Accepted for publication at ESORICS 2013.
Date: received 9 Apr 2013, last revised 28 Jun 2013
Contact author: enr at zurich ibm com
Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation
Note: This is the full version of a paper due to appear at the 18th European Symposium on Research in Computer
Security (ESORICS 2013).
Version: 20130628:150349 (All versions of this report)
Short URL: ia.cr/2013/205
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