Our solutions assume the user has access to either an untrusted online cloud storage service (as per Boyen [14]), or a mobile storage device that is trusted until stolen. In the cloud storage scenario, we consider schemes that optimize for either storage server or online service performance, as well as anonymity and unlinkability of the user's actions. In the mobile storage scenario, we minimize the assumptions we make about the capabilities of the mobile device: we do not assume synchronization, tamper resistance, special or expensive hardware, or extensive cryptographic capabilities. Most importantly, the user's password remains secure even after the mobile device is stolen. Our protocols provide another layer of security against malware and phishing. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to propose such various and provably secure password-based authentication schemes. Lastly, we argue that our constructions are relatively easy to deploy, especially if a few single sign-on services (e.g., Microsoft, Google, Facebook) adopt our proposal.
Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / Password-based authentication, dictionary attacks, malware, honeypots, privacy, mobile Publication Info: Published in Elsevier Computer Networks Journal Date: received 22 Mar 2013, last revised 11 Jun 2013 Contact author: akupcu at ku edu tr Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation Note: The journal version includes a performance section, which is not available in this version. The journal version can be found here: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1389128613001667 Version: 20130611:123521 (All versions of this report) Short URL: ia.cr/2013/167 Discussion forum: Show discussion | Start new discussion