We consider the scenario where there is a credit system whereby users can be rewarded for good work and fined for cheating. We show how to set rewards and fines that incentivize proper behavior from rational contractors, and mitigate the damage caused by malicious contractors. We analyze two strategies: random double-checking by the boss, and hiring multiple contractors to perform the same job.
We also present a bounty mechanism when multiple contractors are employed; the key insight is to give a reward to a contractor who catches another worker cheating. Furthermore, if we can assume that at least a small fraction h of the contractors are honest (1% − 10%), then we can provide graceful degradation for the accuracy of the system and the work the boss has to perform. This is much better than the Byzantine approach, which typically assumes h > 60%.Category / Keywords: applications / game theory and cryptography, cloud computation, cloud computing, mechanism design Publication Info: full technical report version of ACM SIGCOMM NetEcon Workshop 2008 paper Date: received 15 Mar 2013, last revised 15 Mar 2013 Contact author: akupcu at ku edu tr Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation Version: 20130319:183934 (All versions of this report) Short URL: ia.cr/2013/156 Discussion forum: Show discussion | Start new discussion