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Paper 2013/153

On the security of a certicateless signature scheme in the standard model

Lin Cheng and Qiaoyan Wen and Zhengping Jin and Hua Zhang

Abstract

Most of certificateless signature schemes without random oracles can not resist key replacement attack. To overcome this security weakness, Yu et al. recently propose a new certificateless signature scheme and claimed that their scheme is provably secure in the standard model. However, in this paper, we show their scheme is still insecure against key replacement attack where an adversary who replaces the public key of a signer can forge valid signatures on any messages for that signer without knowing the signer's partial secret key. Moreover, we show Yu et al.'s certificateless signature scheme is vulnerable to ``malicious-but-passive'' KGC attack where a malicious KGC can forge valid signatures by embedding extra trapdoors in the system parameter.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
Contact author(s)
stonewoods302 @ 163 com
History
2013-03-15: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2013/153
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY
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