Paper 2013/064

Lightweight Zero-Knowledge Proofs for Crypto-Computing Protocols

Sven Laur and Bingsheng Zhang

Abstract

Crypto-computing is a set of well-known techniques for computing with encrypted data. The security of the corresponding protocols are usually proven in the semi-honest model. In this work, we propose a new class of zero- knowledge proofs, which are tailored for crypto-computing protocols. First, these proofs directly employ properties of the underlying crypto systems and thus many facts have more concise proofs compared to generic solutions. Second, we show how to achieve universal composability in the trusted set-up model where all zero-knowledge proofs share the same system-wide parameters. Third, we de- rive a new protocol for multiplicative relations and show how to combine it with several crypto-computing frameworks to get security in the malicious model.

Note: Protocols and concepts in this version should be more readable and easier to understand. Also, many errors are corrected

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Unknown status
Keywords
Universal composabilityconditional disclosure of secretszero- knowledge proofhomomorphic encryption schemecrypto-computing
Contact author(s)
swen @ math ut ee
History
2014-04-21: revised
2013-02-12: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2013/064
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2013/064,
      author = {Sven Laur and Bingsheng Zhang},
      title = {Lightweight Zero-Knowledge Proofs for Crypto-Computing Protocols},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2013/064},
      year = {2013},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2013/064}
}
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