Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2013/040

An Efficient CCA2-Secure Variant of the McEliece Cryptosystem in the Standard Model

Roohallah Rastaghi

Abstract: Recently, a few chosen-ciphertext secure (CCA2-secure) variants of the McEliece public-key encryption (PKE) scheme in the standard model were introduced. All the proposed schemes are based on encryption repetition paradigm and use general transformation from CPA-secure scheme to a CCA2-secure one. Therefore, the resulting encryption scheme needs \textit{separate} encryption and has \textit{large} key size compared to the original scheme, which complex public key size problem in the code-based PKE schemes. Thus, the proposed schemes are not sufficiently efficient to be used in practice.

In this work, we propose an efficient CCA2-secure variant of the McEliece PKE scheme in the standard model. The main novelty is that, unlike previous approaches, our approach is a generic conversion and can be applied to \textit{any} one-way trapdoor function (OW-TDF), the lowest-level security notion in the context of public-key cryptography, resolving a big fundamental and central problem that has remained unsolved in the past two decades.

Category / Keywords: Post-quantum cryptography, McEliece cryptosystem, IND-CCA2, Permutation algorithm, Standard model.

Publication Info: In Submition

Date: received 26 Jan 2013, last revised 30 Aug 2013

Contact author: r(dot) rastaghi59(at)gmail com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Note: Suggestions and comments are welcome. We also thanks to anyone who read the manuscript and give an alternative proof for the theorem (1).

Version: 20130830:171913 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2013/040

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