Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2013/002
Generalized (Identity-Based) Hash Proof System and Its Applications
Yu Chen and Zongyang Zhang and Dongdai Lin and Zhenfu Cao
Abstract: In this work, we generalize the paradigm of hash proof system (HPS) proposed by Cramer and Shoup [CS02]. In the central of our generalization, we lift subset membership problem to distribution distinguish problem. Our generalized HPS clarifies and encompass all the known public-key encryption (PKE) schemes that essentially implement the idea of hash proof system. Moreover, besides existing smoothness property, we introduce an additional property named anonymity for HPS. As a natural application, we consider anonymity for PKE in the presence of key-leakage, and provide a generic construction of leakage-resilient anonymous PKE from anonymous HPS. We then
extend our generalization to the identity-based setting. Concretely, we generalize the paradigm of identity-based hash proof system (IB-HPS) proposed by Boneh et al. [BGH07] and Alwen et al. [ADN+ 10], and introduce anonymity for it. As an interesting application of anonymous IB-HPS, we consider security for public-key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) in the presence of token-leakage, and provide a generic construction of leakage-resilient secure PEKS from leakage-resilient anonymous IBE, which in turn is based on anonymous IB-HPS.
Category / Keywords: (identity-based) hash proof system, leakage-resilience, anonymity, public-key encryption with keyword search
Publication Info: An extended abstract of this paper has been accepted by Provsec 2012 entitled "Anonymous Identity-Based Hash Proof System and Its Applications". This is the full version with many newly added materials.
Date: received 4 Jan 2013, last revised 4 Jan 2013
Contact author: cycosmic at gmail com
Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation
Note: Compared to the conference version, this version presents the generalization of (IB)-HPS, and proposes the notion of leakage-resilient PEKS with a generic construction.
Version: 20130105:013622 (All versions of this report)
Short URL: ia.cr/2013/002
Discussion forum: Show discussion | Start new discussion
[ Cryptology ePrint archive ]