Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2013/001

Shielding circuits with groups

Eric Miles and Emanuele Viola

Abstract: We show how to efficiently compile any given circuit C into a leakage-resistant circuit C' such that any function on the wires of C' that leaks information during a computation C'(x) yields advantage in computing the product of |C'|^{Omega(1)} elements of the alternating group A_u. In combination with new compression bounds for A_u products, also obtained here, C' withstands leakage from virtually any class of functions against which average-case lower bounds are known. This includes communication protocols, and AC^0 circuits augmented with few arbitrary symmetric gates. If NC^1 \neq TC^0 then then the construction resists TC^0 leakage as well. In addition, we extend the construction to the multi-query setting by relying on a simple secure hardware component.

We build on Barrington's theorem [JCSS '89] and on the previous leakage-resistant constructions by Ishai et al. [Crypto '03] and Faust et al. [Eurocrypt '10]. Our construction exploits properties of A_u beyond what is sufficient for Barrington's theorem.

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Date: received 2 Jan 2013, last revised 2 Jan 2013

Contact author: enmiles at ccs neu edu

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Version: 20130104:195810 (All versions of this report)

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