Paper 2012/728
Defensive Leakage Camouflage
E. Brier, Q. Fortier, R. Korkikian, K. W. Magld, D. Naccache, G. Ozari de Almeida, A. Pommellet, A. H. Ragab, and J. Vuillemin
Abstract
This paper considers the transfer of digital data over {\sl leaky and noisy} communication channels. We develop defensive strategies exploiting the fact that noise prevents the attacker from accurately measuring leakage.
The defense strategy described in this paper pairs each useful data element
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Implementation
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Unknown where it was published
- Keywords
- side channel attacks
- Contact author(s)
- david naccache @ ens fr
- History
- 2013-01-01: revised
- 2013-01-01: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2012/728
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2012/728, author = {E. Brier and Q. Fortier and R. Korkikian and K. W. Magld and D. Naccache and G. Ozari de Almeida and A. Pommellet and A. H. Ragab and J. Vuillemin}, title = {Defensive Leakage Camouflage}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2012/728}, year = {2012}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/728} }